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National Guard Counterdrug Lessons II

7 January 1993



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DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-2500



January 7, 1993

The following is the second National Guard Counterdrug Lessons bulletin published by the National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI). To develop this publication, the NICI Research and Analysis Division reviewed over 2,000 reports submitted to the National Guard Bureau Counterdrug Task Force.

The National Guard continues to conduct a dynamic, evolving program to support drug law enforcement agencies. The number and types of missions performed has increased each year since the Department of Defense established counterdrug support as a national security mission in 1989. Our soldiers and airmen have risen to this challenge, receiving praise from and the appreciation of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies across the nation.

I encourage you to share the techniques, tactics, and procedures developed by your units and organizations while providing counterdrug support. By continually reviewing our performance and seeking ways to improve our efforts, we can provide even better support and add greater value to America.

Francis J. Bray
FRANCIS J. BRAY
Director, Counterdrug
Task Force

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Mission #1, Surface Reconnaissance

Observation. A military SCUBA team was tasked to conduct a clandestine underwater search of a vessel hull for signs of parasitic smuggling. The unit's TO&E equipment was open circuit, allowing exhaled air to bubble to the surface. The bubbles from the SCUBA equipment can be seen and heard by suspects if they are in close proximity to the dive site.

Lesson(s). If underwater searches are intended to be clandestine, divers should use closed circuit ("re-breather") equipment.

(Note: The Florida National Guard has developed a ship-bottom search SOP. To obtain a copy, contact NICI R&A at DCTN 630-9968.)



Observation. Weather conditions, especially temperature, can vary greatly from daytime to nighttime. LP/OP teams must balance the need to "travel light" with the need for sufficiently warm clothing.

Lesson(s). Include predicted weather data in the intelligence annex to the operations order, with a final update provided immediately before deployment. Accordingly, LP/OPs should deploy with appropriate clothing and equipment. Consider the adverse effects of extremely cold or hot weather on battery life during logistical planning.



Observation. Many airports/airfields have changed since map publication. Some airstrips are no longer in use, some are not shown or listed. Many non-airfield areas offer grassy areas or secondary roads easily used for hasty landings and takeoffs.

Lesson(s). Signs of aircraft activity include landing markers, radio antennae, high-wire balls, and wind socks. Touch-down skid marks are another indication of aircraft landings. The presence of these indicators at unmarked/unrecorded airfields may point to covert use for illegal trafficking activities. Multiple reconnaissance missions can prove useful in identifying patterns of air movement.



Observation. Marijuana eradication operations often require the use of aircraft in remote areas for extended periods. Such operations usually take place away from unit aircraft maintenance facilities. The absence of aircraft for refueling or repair of minor deficiencies can severely degrade operations.

Lesson(s).

--Include an individual (pilot-in-command or crew chief) who is command designated to downgrade status symbols to sign off minor deficiencies during remote missions.

--Use refuelers to support aircraft during extended operations.



Mission #2, Surface Surveillance

Observation. The number of suspected illegal border crossings observed often exceed the capability of LEAs to respond when military personnel conduct surveillance along border areas.

Lesson(s).

--Analysis of the terrain as part of counterdrug intelligence preparation of the battlefield (CDIPB) can help to identify the best locations for LEA response teams and maximize their ability to apprehend large numbers of suspects.

--Planners should be prepared to adjust the number of listening post/observation posts (LP/OPs) as experience is gained to determine the most efficient ratio of LP/OPs to LEA response teams.

--The supported LEA should identify indicators of smuggling events to receive priority for interdiction/apprehension. For example, suspects wearing backpacks may be a higher priority for interdiction than suspects who appear to be carrying nothing. If the LP/OPs provide this information in their observation report, the supported LEA can prioritize the efforts of frequently overwhelmed response teams.



Observation. Difficulties in land navigation can delay LEA response times.

Lesson(s).

--If OPSEC and the situation allows it, LEA response teams and LP/OP personnel should conduct a joint daylight reconnaissance of the area of operations. Designate easily identifiable terrain features as reference points to be used by LP/OPs to report locations. If time and the situation permit, response teams and LP/OPs should re-confirm the reference points during darkness before beginning operations. (They will often look different at night.)

--LP/OPs can develop "range cards" and provide copies to response teams. Range cards are drawn-to-scale sketches showing terrain features, distances, and reference points. A range card can be used like a map to direct response teams to the location of suspected illegal activity. Range cards must be treated as sensitive documents if they indicate LP/OP locations.



Observation. During the planning process for a joint counterdrug operation, LEA intelligence indicated that ports of entry (POEs) and surrounding areas were being used for drug trafficking. Smuggling activity appeared to cease when counterdrug personnel arrived on site to support an interdiction operation. Participants believed this was due to compromise of the operation.

Lesson(s).

--OPSEC must be one of the most important considerations during interdiction operations. Off-duty personnel in particular may present a threat of compromise. Even if individuals maintain complete verbal

secrecy concerning operations, the mere appearance of "strangers" in an area can compromise an operation. Personnel should be fully briefed on the threat and OPSEC prior to deployment. If personnel will not be in the field for the duration of an operation, planners should consider means to control off-duty exposure of counterdrug personnel (such as billeting at a military base, if available, or using lodgings some distance away from the POE or area of operations).

--Operations can be targeted over a wide area as a countermeasure to any changes in trafficking routes. LP/OP and other tactical locations can also be shifted during an operation to inhibit the drug trafficker's ability to adjust to the presence of counterdrug forces.

--To reduce the likelihood that the occupants will be identified as military personnel, consider the use of vehicles with tinted windows for the insertion and extraction of LP/OP teams.



Observation. Passive, light intensifying night vision goggles (NVGs) were used during an operation to observe an airport at night. The lighting in the area tended to "wash out" the NVGs and render them ineffective for observation.

Lesson(s).

--Include an analysis of lighting conditions when performing counterdrug intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Consider the presence of artificial lighting as well as ambient light. In well-lit areas, large objective binoculars or telescopes may be more effective than NVGs. Thermal imagery

or infra-red systems may also provide an effective alternative to NVGs.

--Military personnel can obtain a light data computer program developed by the Command and Control Microcomputer Users' Group (C2MUG) at Ft. Leavenworth. Using an IBM-compatible personal computer, this program will provide solar and lunar light data (sun/moon rise and set, percent illumination, etc.) for any latitude and longitude. To obtain a copy of this military shareware, send a written request and a blank MS-DOS formatted diskette (3-1/2" or 5-1/4") to the NICI R&A Division at:

NICI
ATTN: Research & Analysis Div
P.O. Box 8104
San Luis Obispo, CA 93403-8104



**Mission #4, Aerial
Reconnaissance**

Observation. Military maps are often not available for areas in which marijuana eradication is planned. Civilian maps frequently do not have topography or sufficient detail to conduct aerial navigation to specific sites on the ground. Cross country flight over remote areas may pose similar difficulties.

Lesson(s). When possible, use local air crews who are familiar with the terrain. Loran or ground positioning systems (GPS) can also be effective navigational aids.



Observation. Land navigation and coordination between National Guard aircraft and LEA personnel on the ground can be difficult due to the use of different maps and nicknames for terrain features.

Lesson(s). Air crews and ground teams should use the same maps during an operation and conduct a detailed, face-to-face coordination meeting prior to operations. Identify terrain features for use as reference points during coordination meetings. Rehearse procedures for passing information between air and ground crews.



Observation. National Guard aircraft provided support for an operation that also included civilian aircraft. Weather conditions prevented the NG aircraft from flying, but the civilian aircraft still performed the mission. In the minds of some of the law enforcement officers involved, the fact that the civilians flew but the NG did not created the perception of a lack of support or commitment on the part of the military.

Lesson(s). Brief LEAs on military flight requirements prior to the mission so they understand the conditions under which military flight plans must be altered or canceled. Make contingency plans to anticipate the possibility of poor weather or other constraints. In the case of a joint civilian-military flight operation, advise the supported LEA up front that military flight restrictions are

far more stringent than civilian regulations.



Mission #5, Aerial Surveillance

Observation. Aircraft radios were used extensively during a mission while the aircraft was "shut down" on the ground. This procedure drained the aircraft batteries, leaving insufficient power to start the engine when it was time to takeoff. (This problem is most often encountered with OH-58-series aircraft.)

Lesson(s). If long periods of communication will be required while an aircraft is on the ground, either plan for the use of non-aircraft radios such as AN/PRC-77s or LEA-type hand-helds or use aircraft with an auxiliary power unit (such as the UH-60).



Mission #6, Aerial Transportation Support.

Observation. A mission to provide aerial transportation of contraband was requested with only 24 hours notice. Personnel were used incidental to training in an inactive duty training (IDT/IAD) status. Due to short notice and the IDT/IAD status, the unit could not provide all meals to the soldiers conducting the operation.

Lesson(s). Personnel who have completed required counterdrug training and screening (use of force, urinalysis, etc.) should be identified as a "ready reaction force." A stock of MREs should be maintained to support short notice missions. Additionally, NGR (AR) 500-2/NGR (AF) 55-6, paragraph 2-7d states "counterdrug support mission costs associated with IDT/IAD or AT training that include above normal expenditures (such as lodging) may be charged to counterdrug support accounts." When meals are purchased on the economy this provision may be used to authorize reimbursement to soldiers for non-available meals.



**Mission #8, Cargo
Inspection**

Observation. Cargo and packing materials undergoing inspection can present a health threat to Guard members.

Lesson(s). Cargo inspection personnel should receive continuous training on the recognition of potentially hazardous materials and threat updates from the US Customs facility receiving support. Even legitimate cargo may be packed in caustic or carcinogenic materials. Personnel should wear rubber gloves to prevent the transmission of communicable diseases or infection, especially when handling fresh or frozen foods and animal by-products. Rubber gloves work better than latex "hospital" gloves because they are less prone to tearing and can be washed and re-used. Leather work gloves may soak up hazardous liquids. Regardless of what

materials are believed to be involved, personnel should wear dust masks when dealing with powdered substances or when airborne particles are present.



**Mission #10, Aerial Photo
Reconnaissance.**

Observation. An Air National Guard unit flew aerial photo reconnaissance over eight targets-- a mission that took several days to complete due to inclement weather. Information on one target was required immediately for a pending arrest, but the supported LEA had to wait while the other target missions were completed.

Lesson(s).

--Identify priorities and time requirements when processing support requests. (Establishing the priority of support is important for all types of counterdrug support. Ask the LEA, "If we can't do everything, what would you like us to do first?")

--Consider dividing support requests into multiple missions to increase flexibility.

--When LEAs request aerial reconnaissance, the target area descriptions should be as specific as possible. A statement of "intent" for reconnaissance of the target can be useful in determining the best support to be provided.



**Mission #14, Admin, Information,
Log, and Maintenance Support.**

Observation. Translators are generally proficient at day-to-day language, but may have difficulty with legal terms-- both in English and the language being translated.

Lesson(s). Provide personnel conducting translation support with a point of contact concerning legal terms and issues. A fax machine can be useful to transmit materials to subject matter experts in order to answer legal and other questions concerning documents.



Miscellaneous Issues.

Observation. Counterdrug personnel on ADSW were frequently paid late because their parent unit was not sufficiently manned to handle the extra paperwork requirements.

Lesson(s). Counterdrug Coordinators/POMSOs should consider augmenting payroll sections to assist in processing pay for counterdrug ADSW personnel.



Logistics Issues.

Observation. Personnel conducting counterdrug operations often use civilian rental vehicles. These vehicles are

usually in brand-new condition with an "official" appearance that can degrade OPSEC.

Lesson(s). Most cities have "low-end" rental car companies that specialize in renting used vehicles. Counterdrug personnel may wish to rent used cars for transportation when OPSEC is an issue. Another OPSEC method to consider is to remove license plate frames and company stickers from rental vehicles.



Observation. After experiencing mechanical problems, personnel using a rental vehicle on a counterdrug mission took the vehicle directly into a repair shop without first contacting the vendor. Because this procedure violated the rental contract, the vendor refused to pay the costs of the repairs.

Lesson(s). Develop SOPs on the use of rental vehicles; brief drivers on these procedures. Include the following subjects: insurance and civilian driver's license requirements, where to get fuel and how to pay for it, what to do if the vehicle breaks down, definitions of appropriate or "official" uses (for example, can staff members use a rental car to go to lunch? sick call? scheduled medical appointments?), and what to do in case of an accident.



Suggested Counterdrug Priority Information Requirements (PIR)

Observation. Military intelligence analysts providing counterdrug support quickly discover that military and law enforcement personnel tend to hold differing concepts of the intelligence process. Because of its focus on a Soviet-type threat, many aspects of the traditional military intelligence process are not appropriate for counterdrug operations.

Lesson(s). With some modification, use of the military intelligence process can contribute to joint counterdrug operations.

For example, the first step in the intelligence process is collection and evaluation. Collection begins with a collection plan whereby all intelligence collection assets are focused on the organization's priority information requirements (PIRs). The counterdrug operation commander and his intelligence staff should develop PIRs based upon information gaps in what is known about the drug traffickers that will be the target of joint counterdrug operations. Consider the following list of PIRs:

- What illegal drug activity has previously occurred in the area in which operations will take place?
- What locations are likely to be used by drug traffickers as lookout positions?
- What routes are drug traffickers likely to use?
- What weapons are the drug traffickers likely to possess?

- What electronic collection and countermeasures do the traffickers possess (e.g., scanners, radar detectors, etc.)?

- What will be the threats posed to counterdrug forces (e.g., booby traps, violence, natural hazards, etc.)?

- What are the trafficker modes of operation (cultivation methods, trafficking routes/methods, security consciousness, weapons of choice, propensity for violence)?

- What are the likely responses by traffickers to counterdrug operations (change in modes of operation, confrontation/avoidance of contact, ceasing activities, ability to influence the situation)?

- How are the traffickers organized? What are their alliances and connections?

- What are the drug traffickers' strengths and weaknesses concerning the weather, terrain, environment, and economics?

- What are the capabilities and intentions of targeted drug traffickers?

- What operations security (OPSEC) measures should be taken by counterdrug forces?

- What routes should counterdrug forces use to ingress and egress areas selected for interdiction action? What methods of movement should they use?*

As PIRs are answered, new requirements for information will be identified. In addition, the information

* The PIRs shown here are taken from an interdiction operation. They will generally apply to most counterdrug missions. Operations in urban areas or eradication operations, however, may require a different set of PIR. Therefore, no single standard list of PIR can be developed-- they must be tailored to each individual operation.

collected must be analyzed and integrated into the counterdrug operational plan.



**Terrain Analysis in Counterdrug
Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield (CDIPB)**

Observation. Law enforcement intelligence often concentrates on specific cases and individuals; this can result in insufficient attention to the effects of terrain and weather on operations. Traditional military intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) provides a framework for analyzing terrain and weather, but requires modification to be more applicable to counterdrug operations.

Lesson(s). One of the most valuable management tools a planner can use in counterdrug operations, counterdrug intelligence preparation of the battlefield (CDIPB) ties intelligence developed during the intelligence process into actual operations. (Some organizations substitute the word "operation" for the word "battlefield." Regardless of semantics, the process is the same.) CDIPB is an intellectual process of analysis and evaluation that is modified from traditional military intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

CDIPB is a five-step process consisting of: Battlefield Area Evaluation, Terrain Analysis, Weather Analysis, Threat Evaluation, and Threat Integration. The following section describes terrain analysis in the context of counterdrug operations.

Terrain Analysis reduces uncertainty regarding the effects of terrain on drug trafficking activities. Determining how the terrain will influence drug traffickers will assist the analyst in predicting where smugglers will move. Terrain factors will differently affect each mode of travel used by traffickers. Therefore, each mode of transport must be independently evaluated. For example, rugged terrain will prevent movement by vehicle but provides security for foot and pack animal trafficking. Highways will facilitate truck movement but will usually be avoided by smugglers using foot and animal transportation.

The following terrain factors will influence drug traffickers' use of the terrain:

- Vegetation
- Soil composition
- Surface drainage
- Slope
- Obstacles
- Transportation networks
- Cross-country mobility
(wet and dry)
- Concealment

Each of these factors will affect drug traffickers ability to move their loads and their ability to hide from interdiction forces.

Terrain analysis in CDIPB focuses on the drug trafficking aspects of the terrain; they are:

- Observation
- Concealment
- Obstacles
- Key Terrain
- Avenues of Approach

Observation involves the influence of the terrain on the reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of both drug traffickers and counterdrug forces. In CDIPB it refers to both visual and electronic line of sight (LOS). In the most rudimentary sense, LOS is the unobstructed view from one point to another. Radios, radar, and electronic intercept equipment require LOS to effectively function. Aided and unaided human vision, from the air as well as the ground, also require LOS.

In the context of drug trafficking operations, observation is primarily a means of evading detection. Drug traffickers will attempt to spot counterdrug personnel, and thus evade them, before they are spotted themselves. Evading detection depends heavily on unrestricted vision.

Drug traffickers will attempt to exploit the natural features of the terrain to maximize the effectiveness of visual observation and that of communications and electronic monitoring equipment. Day and night observation devices, radios, radar detectors, and scanners will be located to fully take advantage of their capability to provide early warning of law enforcement efforts.

In addition to LOS, the analyst must also consider line of fire. If information can be obtained on the types of weapons the traffickers are likely to use, the analyst can develop a weapons range template. This step may identify observation post locations that are outside of threat weapons range but still possess LOS to areas the traffickers are likely to move through.

Concealment is essentially the "flip side" of observation. It is protection from air and ground observation. For drug traffickers, concealment is vital to avoid detection and interdiction by counterdrug forces. The CDIPB analyst determines the amount of concealment afforded by the terrain and vegetation. He considers observation from both the ground and air. Drug traffickers can be expected to move where the vegetation and terrain offer the best concealment. Drug smuggling aircraft will use low level flight and terrain-following techniques to avoid detection by radar. Maritime smugglers may use remote beaches and harbors to covertly off-load their shipments. They may also attempt to "blend in" with legitimate sea traffic to avoid visual and radar detection.

Concealment is also becoming an increasingly important consideration in eradication operations. Marijuana cultivators often attempt to hide their gardens from aerial observation by locating them under forest canopies or within the fog line of coastal areas. Indoor operations are also becoming an increasingly prevalent means to hide marijuana cultivation from law enforcement.*

Obstacles are natural or man-made features that stop, impede, or divert the movement of traffickers and/or counterdrug forces. The impact of obstacles on the movement of drug traffickers make them an important

* While it is less of a consideration in counterdrug operations than it is in combat operations, the analyst should also think about the presence of cover. Cover is protection from direct (and indirect) fire. In traditional combat operations it is often created by digging foxholes and bunkers.

analytical factor during terrain analysis. The analyst must determine the location of obstacles to foot, horse/mule, vehicular, maritime, and air movement as well as what effects removing, overcoming, or bypassing these obstacles will have on trafficking operations. The effects of weather on soil and river crossing sites is also a primary consideration in obstacle analysis.

Key Terrain are areas that provide a marked advantage to the force that occupies or controls them. Key terrain may include any feature which traffickers or counterdrug forces can use to their advantage. The most important aspect of the terrain to drug traffickers will be locations that facilitate logistical support and security. High ground overlooking high speed avenues of ingress and egress may become key terrain for their value as observation posts. Residences or other structures may also become key terrain to provide temporary refuge from counterdrug forces, observation sites, or locations to stash drug loads.

Avenues of Approach (AAs) are analyzed from the perspective of both the drug traffickers and counterdrug forces. AAs are a conceptual tool to identify likely areas of movement. Since it is impossible to watch everything, AAs provide a focus on areas in which traffickers are most likely to move.

AAs are essentially air, ground, and maritime routes available for trafficking or movement of counterdrug forces. They can be roads, trails, rivers, harbors, or terrain features like valleys which facilitate low level flight. Trafficking

AAs are evaluated in terms of expected trafficking modes of transportation. Counterdrug force AAs are evaluated in terms of the means planned for the movement of interdiction forces. (In other words, it may not be possible to move an arrest team by vehicle into an area of rough terrain used by traffickers on foot or pack animal.)

If smuggling is expected to occur on foot or by pack animal, AAs would be accessible trails that provide good mobility and concealment to traffickers. AAs for vehicles would be roads or flat areas between ports of entry where smugglers are likely to sneak across the border. Maritime AAs would include rivers or beach sites where traffickers might attempt to move their loads to a means of ground transportation.

An important distinction between avenues of approach in CDIPB and those of traditional IPB is the potential for changes in the mode of transportation. For example, an armor unit will not typically change into light infantry when reaching a "NO-GO" area, then turn back into armor when the terrain becomes "GO." Drug traffickers, however, may move drugs by truck to rough terrain between ports of entry, unload and have the drugs moved across the border on foot or by pack animal, then re-load the drugs onto waiting trucks on the other side of the border.

Terrain analysis emphasizes the use of graphics to portray the effects of terrain on drug trafficking and counterdrug operations. Analysis of the drug trafficking aspects of terrain is primarily accomplished through the preparation and analysis of terrain factor overlays. For example, the analyst can

develop overlays to depict the following terrain factors that do not show on topographic or military maps:

- Long established smuggling routes
- River width, depth, velocity, bank height, and river bed composition for determining crossing points and crossing restrictions
- Terrain features such as caves, abandoned mines, and structures which are ideally suited to concealment of drug loads
- Vegetation and irrigation ditches that provide concealment
- Changes to terrain over a period of years such as roads, highways, and checkpoints
- Locations where "key terrain" elements of the local population provide drug traffickers logistical support such as access to river or border crossing sites, boats, boat docks, private roads and structures, landing strips, etc.

Analyzing Avenues of Approach

The factors used to analyze AAs are based on terrain, intelligence, and statistical history. Analysis of terrain factors studies those aspects of the terrain that traffickers will consider important to successful movement of their loads. Terrain factors include:

1. **Availability of alternate routes.** Traffickers will seek alternate routes to provide them a range of options to react to the presence of counterdrug forces.
2. **Availability of escape routes.** Traffickers will attempt to use routes that provide rapid withdrawal from crossing or stash sites. Their intent will

be to reduce their vulnerability to interdiction during movement.

3. **Security.** Traffickers will select routes that provide them the greatest security. They will normally avoid checkpoints and areas they believe contain counterdrug forces.

4. **Crossing sites.** Obstacles, such as rivers, and open spaces with no concealment constitute danger areas for traffickers. If they cannot avoid these areas they will select crossing sites that allow the most rapid movement and reduced vulnerability. The impact of weather on river crossing sites is an especially important consideration.

Intelligence and statistical factors incorporate known or suspected information on trafficking activity with the terrain. Some of these indicators include:

1. **Evidence of electronic surveillance or communications equipment.** Traffickers routinely use electronic surveillance equipment to monitor law enforcement activity. Communications equipment is used to coordinate smuggling operations. Confirmed reports of traffickers using surveillance and communications equipment correlates to potential trafficking activity within a particular area or AA.

2. **Visual signs of trafficking activity.** Visual indicators of smuggling include the discovery of abandoned or stashed loads, drug packaging or waterproofing debris, and vehicle or foot tracks crossing the border between ports of entry or in other areas where legitimate traffic is unlikely.

3. **Seizures of drug loads** provide an obvious indicator of trafficking activity in a particular area or AA.

4. **Logistical support factors.** As with any activity involving the transportation of personnel and materials, drug trafficking requires a system of logistical support. Some of the logistical support factors that correlate with drug trafficking are:

a) Transportation networks, such as railroads and public and private roads to which the traffickers have access;

b) Known or suspected property (structures or land) controlled by trafficking organizations that may facilitate the storage and movement of drug loads;

c) Known or suspected stash sites and staging areas for drug shipments.

Weather Analysis

The weather in an area of operation (AO) or an area of interest (AI) is analyzed to determine its effect on trafficking activity and counterdrug operations. The analysis of terrain and weather are inseparable because the environment surrounding smuggling activity requires them to be considered simultaneously.

Consider the following weather factors when performing counterdrug intelligence preparation of the battlefield (CDIPB):

- Humidity
- Visibility
- Surface winds and winds aloft

- Precipitation
- Temperature
- Cloud data
- Light data (sunrise, sunset, moon illumination)
- Severe weather

Extreme weather conditions must be anticipated for their effects on personnel and equipment. Very cold weather will reduce the battery life of communications equipment. Cold weather clothing will increase the weight loads on personnel who must walk to their positions. Hot weather can reduce the life of electronic equipment. It will also increase the amount of water necessary to sustain personnel in the field.

Light data is important to anticipate the effects of illumination conditions on both counterdrug forces and traffickers. An analysis of smuggling history within a particular AO may indicate that traffickers are more likely to operate when there is no moon. Consideration of light conditions is vitally important when planning aviation support to an operation.

The current combined effects of weather and terrain must be continuously updated during counterdrug operations.

Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO)

The Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) incorporates all terrain and weather-induced obstacles. The basic product of the area evaluation, terrain analysis, and weather analysis phases of the CDIPB process, it is used

to show the ease or difficulty of movement through an area.

For example, heavy rainfall may make normal river crossing sites impassable. Precipitation can create muddy areas that prevent vehicle movement and severely restrict foot or pack animal traffic. The combined effects of weather and terrain must be considered for each mode of travel. Heavy rain will have little effect on vehicles using asphalt highways, but thunderstorms may prevent aircraft from flying. In general, reduced visibility will favor ground drug trafficking operations.

The degree of detail shown on the MCOO depends on the size and location of the operation and the amount of time and data available. At a minimum, it should indicate AAs for the expected type(s) of smuggling (air, ground-- by foot or vehicle, maritime), obstacles, and key terrain.

(Note: Future issues of National Guard Counterdrug Lessons will address Battlefield Area Evaluation, Threat Analysis, and Threat Integration.)



After Action Reporting

Timely and accurate submission of after action reports is critical to the success of the National Guard counterdrug support program. Lessons learned identified during operations should be submitted as a part of after

action reporting as required by National Guard Regulation (AR) 500-2/ (AF) 55-6.

After action reports (AARs) should be submitted to CNGB, ATTN: NGB-CD, Pentagon Rm 2D374, Washington, D.C. 20310-2500. (See *The Counterdrug Coordinator's Handbook* for the format.)

Questions concerning National Guard AARs should be addressed to the Counterdrug Support Division (NGB-CDS) at (703) 756-5850 or DCTN 286-5850.

For questions concerning the material in this publication, please contact the NICI Research and Analysis Division at (805) 549-3968/ DCTN 630-9968.



For Further Information...

The National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI), a federally funded activity of the Department of Defense, was established December 12, 1990, by the Honorable Stephen M. Duncan, Department of Defense Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support. NICI supports the National Drug Control Strategy by training representatives of law enforcement and military organizations, analyzing tactics and procedures, establishing a repository of lessons learned, and disseminating information on counterdrug-related issues, seminars, and conferences.

The National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI) provides management-level training in the planning and conduct of joint counterdrug operations to both military and law enforcement personnel. The Counterdrug Managers' Course (CMC) is a five-day course presented by NICI approximately twenty times a year. The course is designed to enhance the interoperability of military and drug law enforcement agencies.

NICI also provides a Drug Prevention and Demand Reduction Course (DPDR) approximately four times a year. This five-day course trains military and law enforcement personnel, public officials, business and community leaders, educators, counselors, and military family support group members to develop effective counterdrug programs within their communities.

NICI classes are conducted at San Luis Obispo, California and various other sites across the United States. Individuals interested in attending NICI courses should contact NICI student services at (805) 549-3966 or DCTN 630-9966.

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The Research and Analysis (R&A) Division of NICI publishes a monthly *NICI Bulletin* to provide information to the counterdrug community (drug law enforcement agencies and their military counterparts) on counterdrug-related conferences and seminars. To be placed on the mailing list for the *NICI Bulletin*, or to have information on your conference or seminar included in the bulletin, contact the NICI R&A Division at (805) 549-3968 or DSN 630-9968.

The NICI Research and Analysis Division also maintains an extensive library of materials on joint counterdrug operations and general drug policy issues. The Division offers a Request for Information service free of charge to the counterdrug community. Contact them to obtain copies of publications or to ask questions concerning military support to counterdrug operations.